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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the most important issues in private international law is the question of when 
a court will take jurisdiction over a civil dispute involving a defendant who is not 
present in the forum and who does not submit to the proceedings. Since M orguard 
Investments Ltd. v. D e Savoye the requirement has been that there must be “a real and 
substantial connection” between the dispute and the forum to take jurisdiction in such 
a case.1 This phrase is at the heart of the analysis of jurisdiction, both at common law 
and in recent statutes dealing with the issue.
By necessity, the real and substantial connection requirement has to be both 
sufficiently open-ended and flexible to accommodate the wide range of civil cases 
that come before Canadian courts and sufficiently clear to provide a common frame 
of reference and produce predictable results. In 2002 the Court of Appeal for Ontario 
created a framework for analyzing a real and substantial connection, setting out, in 
Muscutt v. Courcelles, eight factors to consider.2 This framework became the standard 
in Ontario and was adopted by appellate courts in some other Canadian provinces. 
However, in 2009, in preparing to hear two appeals of decisions on motions challenging 
the court’s jurisdiction,3 the Court of Appeal for Ontario indicated that it was willing to 
consider whether any changes were required to the Muscutt framework.
The two cases, consolidated on appeal as Van Breda v. Village Resorts 
Lim ited , each concerned serious injuries that were suffered outside of Ontario.4 In the 
case of Charron Estate v. Bel A ir Travel Group Ltd., Mr. Charron went on a holiday to 
Cuba and died during a scuba dive. His estate and dependants sued several defendants 
in Ontario, one of which was Club Resorts Ltd., a Cayman Islands corporation that
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managed the resort in Cuba and had arranged the scuba diving. In the other case, Ms. 
Van Breda was on holiday in Cuba. She was using a chin-up bar at a resort when it 
collapsed, which rendered her a paraplegic. She and her family members sued several 
defendants in Ontario, including Club Resorts Ltd., which was also the manager of 
that resort. Club Resorts Ltd. argued before the motion judges and on the appeal 
that the Ontario court did not have jurisdiction over these claims. The motion judges 
applied the framework in Muscutt and dismissed the defendants’ motions, finding that 
there was a real and substantial connection between the claim against Club Resorts 
Ltd., and Ontario. Ultimately the Court of Appeal reached the identical conclusion 
and dismissed both appeals. It is the appellate court’s reasoning, more than the result, 
that is worthy of close study.
2. WILLINGNESS TO REVISE THE FRAMEWORK
The Court of Appeal identified five reasons why it was prepared to reconsider the 
framework from Muscutt.5 First, the Court could have considered seven years worth 
of jurisprudence to evaluate how the framework was handling a wide range of factual 
situations. Second, the Court could take into account subsequent decisions, particularly 
those of the Supreme Court of Canada, that bear on the issue of taking jurisdiction. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Court could have compared the common 
law with recent statutes on jurisdiction adopted in other provinces. At the time of 
Muscutt, the Uniform Law Conference of Canada had developed its model Uniform 
Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act,6 but it had only been adopted in one 
province.7 Since Muscutt, support has been growing for the CJPTA and it has been 
adopted in two other provinces.8 Fourth, the Court could have assessed the impact of 
the emerging concept of a “forum of necessity,” allowing a court to take jurisdiction 
even in the absence of a real and substantial connection.9 Fifth, the Court could take 
into account the extensive academic literature on the Muscutt framework over the past 
decade.
Yet these five reasons, taken separately or together, are not so forceful that 
a change in the jurisprudence was inevitable. In fact, the Court defended its earlier 
decision in quite strong terms, noting “With regard to the alleged uncertainty produced
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by Muscutt, the appellants did not challenge the correctness of the results reached in 
the Muscutt quintet and were unable to identify conflicting or wrongly decided cases 
under the Muscutt test.”10 Defendants frequently challenge the jurisdiction of Ontario 
courts, and so it is remarkable that in all that jurisprudence there are so few examples- 
if any-of incorrect decisions. This is high praise for the Muscutt framework.
Despite this apparent success, the Court determined that “it is appropriate to 
make several clarifications and modifications to the Muscutt test.”11 The Court offered 
two central reasons for this conclusion. First, it wanted to adopt some of the features 
of the CJPTA, bringing Ontario into line with the national approach to jurisdiction. 
Second, it considered itself obliged to address the criticism that the eight-factor test is 
too complicated and hard to apply.12
3. A PRESUMPTION OF A REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTION
In Ontario, rule 17.02 of the Rules o f  Civil Procedure provides that a plaintiff may 
serve a defendant outside Ontario with an originating process in certain defined 
categories of cases.13 For example, the category in rule 17.02(g) covers claims “in 
respect of a tort committed in Ontario.” Prior to Morguard, the analysis of jurisdiction 
centered on whether the plaintiff’s claim fell within one or more of the enumerated 
categories. However, M orguard established, and Muscutt confirmed, that rule 17.02 
did not in itself create jurisdiction. Separate and apart from whether the claim fell 
inside the categories, the plaintiff had to establish that there was a real and substantial 
connection between the dispute and the forum.14
In Van Breda the Court made a significant change to the relationship between 
the categories in rule 17.02 and the real and substantial connection requirement. It 
has now held that if a case falls within the categories in rule 17.02, other than rules 
17.02(h) and (o), a real and substantial connection with Ontario shall be presumed to 
exist.15 The central catalyst for this change is section 10 of the CJPTA. Section 3 of 
that statute provides in quite general terms that a court has jurisdiction when there is a 
real and substantial connection between the dispute and the forum. However, section
10 contains a list of specific situations in which a real and substantial connection is
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presumed to exist. Ontario has not adopted the CJPTA, but in Van Breda the Court has 
adopted the CJPTA’s basic approach.16
This change raises several questions. First, how comparable are the rule 
17.02 categories and the presumptions in section 10 of the CJPTA? Second, why are 
the categories in rules 17.02(h) and (o) excluded? Third, how will the presumption 
operate when challenged by defendants?
The factual connections itemized in section 10 of the CJPTA were drafted 
specifically to serve as presumptions of a real and substantial connection. The 
categories in rule 17.02 were not. The Court stressed the similarities in wording 
between the two,17 and much of the language is very similar, but there are some 
important differences. Rule 17.02(d) catches a claim against a trustee in respect of the 
execution of a trust as long as there are any trust assets in Ontario. In contrast, section 
10(d) provides that if the basis for jurisdiction is trust assets in Ontario, the relief 
claimed must be only in respect of those assets. Rule 17.02(f)(iv) catches a claim 
where a contract has been breached in Ontario. There is no equivalent provision in 
section 10. Yet in Van Breda the court gave all aspects of rule 17.02, other than rules 
17.02(h) and (o), the same presumptive effect as section 10 of the CJPTA.
As noted, in Van Breda the Court excludes rule 17.02(h), dealing with cases in 
which damage has been sustained in Ontario, and rule 17.02(o), dealing with necessary 
or proper parties. The Court did this on the grounds that these categories are too broad 
to reliably indicate a real and substantial connection with Ontario.18 This approach is 
quite correct, and it was precisely this breadth that led the court in Muscutt to separate 
the rule 17.02 analysis from the real and substantial connection requirement. But, as 
noted above, there is breadth in some of the other rule 17.02 categories. The exclusion 
of only rules 17.02(h) and (o) is somewhat imprecise. The Court could have given 
presumptive effect only to those elements of rule 17.02 that have a direct equivalent in 
the CJPTA, but it did not so limit its reasoning. In addition, the Court’s middle-ground 
approach means that when the rule 17.02 categories are amended, or new categories 
are added, the courts will have to determine whether presumptive effect applies in 
respect of those changes on a case-by-case basis.
Presumptions raise the classic debate between certainty and flexibility. The 
presumed outcome provides the former, while the fact that the presumption can be 
rebutted provides the latter. As a result, an important issue with any presumption
16 The Ontario Law Commission is studying whether Ontario should adopt the CJPTA: see the 
consultation paper by Janet Walker entitled “Reforming the Law of Crossborder Litigation: 
Judicial Jurisdiction”; Vaughan Black & Stephen G.A. Pitel, “Reform of Ontario’s Law on 
Jurisdiction” (2009) 47 C.B.L.J. 469.
17 Van Breda, supra note 4 at para. 74.
18 Ibid. at paras. 78-79.
is the test for rebutting it. The more difficult it is to rebut, the less flexibility; the 
easier, the less certainty. In Van Breda the Court was silent on this issue: it made no 
explicit statement as to how hard or easy it is to rebut the presumption. In the appeal 
in Ms. Van Breda’s case, the Court stated “As this presumption is not conclusive, it 
remains open to [the defendant] to demonstrate that in the particular circumstances of 
the case, the real and substantial connection test is not met.”19 The Court then went 
on to conclude that there was a real and substantial connection to Ontario. It appears, 
from this analysis, that the presumption will not have any particular tenacity: once the 
defendant challenges it, the court will analyze whether there is, or is not, a real and 
substantial connection. This is the preferred approach, since in the area of assessing 
jurisdiction flexibility is highly important and should take priority over certainty.
In the future, in the cases where the defendant seeks to rebut the presumption 
it would be unfortunate if courts used the presumption as an express basis for their 
decisions. In such cases the courts should articulate whether the factors to be 
considered indicate that there is, or is not, a real and substantial connection to Ontario. 
The courts should refrain from merely concluding that the factors identified by the 
defendant are insufficient to rebut the presumed real and substantial connection. Van 
Breda leaves both possible lines of reasoning open, which is worrying, but in the 
specific appeal before the court the issue is properly assessed.
4. REFORMULATION OF THE FRAMEWORK
Adopting presumptions of a real and substantial connection only takes matters so far. 
A framework for analyzing whether there is a real and substantial connection is still 
required in any case where a defendant seeks to refute a presumption, any case in 
which a plaintiff is relying on rule 17.02(h) or (o) so that no presumption arises, and 
any case in which a plaintiff does not rely on 17.02 at all and instead seeks leave of 
the court to serve a defendant outside Ontario under rule 17.03. Prior to Van Breda 
the courts used the Muscutt framework, which considered the following eight factors 
to determine whether there was a real and substantial connection to Ontario: (1) the 
connection between the forum and the plaintiff’s claim, (2) the connection between 
the forum and the defendant, (3) unfairness to the defendant in taking jurisdiction, 
(4) unfairness to the plaintiff in not taking jurisdiction, (5) the involvement of other 
parties, (6) the court’s willingness to enforce a foreign judgment rendered on the same 
jurisdictional basis, (7) whether the dispute is international or interprovincial, and (8) 
comity and the standards of jurisdiction used by other courts.20
19 Ibid. at para. 136. See also para. 109(1): “If one of the connections identified in rule 17.02 
(excepting subrules (h) and (o)) is made out, the defendant bears the burden of showing that 
a real and substantial connection does not exist” [emphasis added].
20 Supra note 1 at paras. 75-110.
Despite how well the Muscutt framework has been operating, in Van Breda  
the Court determined that it was necessary to “simplify the test and to provide for 
more clarity and ease in its application.”21 Unfortunately, it is highly debatable as to 
whether the Court has achieved that objective. An early concern in this respect is that 
the Court’s summary of the reformulated framework is considerably longer and denser 
than the eight factors listed in Muscutt.22
Since M uscutt one of the key debates has been whether factors (3) to (8) 
are properly relevant to assessing jurisdiction or should be confined to the forum  non 
conveniens analysis. In Van Breda the Court took a middle ground position that is 
difficult to explain. It held that “the core of the real and substantial connection test” is 
factors (1) and (2), and held that factors (3) to (8) will now “serve as analytic tools to 
assist the court in assessing the significance of the connections between the forum, the 
claim and the defendant.”23 The Court affirms that factors (3) to (8) remain relevant 
to the issue of jurisdiction, which is welcome and much preferable to excluding them 
altogether. But the Court nevertheless reworks the framework, ostensibly so that no 
one factor from factors (3) to (8) could be analyzed separately from the other factors 
and could be independently determinative of the outcome. However, the jurisprudence 
since Muscutt shows this concern to be unwarranted: factors (3) to (8) have not been 
used in that way. The eight-factor framework has not produced decisions in which 
courts have held, for example, that the test is met based solely on unfairness to the 
plaintiff in not taking jurisdiction. Moreover, the Court’s own new approach is 
somewhat at odds with its own language about factor (6), which both in principle and 
in application the court still seemed to treat as an independent factor.24
As a practical test for a real and substantial connection, the new Van Breda  
framework is disappointing. A factor either should be considered or it should not, and 
it confuses matters to re-label a relevant factor as an analytic tool. The Court holds 
that factors (3) to (8) should no longer be listed “as one of several items on a multi­
factor list having more or less equal weight with the other factors.”25 But factors need 
to be listed in a reasonably convenient way for courts to take them into account. And it 
is not correct to suggest, as the Court does, that in the jurisprudence applying Muscutt 
each of these factors problematically had more or less the same weight. It has been 
well established, for example, that factors (1) and (2) carry relatively more weight. 
Overall the Court’s language on factors (3) to (8) is unfortunately vague: phases like 
“analytic tool,” “general principle of law,” and “principle a court should bear in mind”
21 Supra note 4 at para. 83.
22 Ibid. at para. 109.
23 Ibid. at para. 84.
24 Ibid. at para. 103: “If the court would not be prepared to recognize and enforce an extra­
provincial judgment against an Ontario defendant rendered on the same jurisdictional basis, 
it should not assume jurisdiction against the extra-provincial defendant”. See also para. 124.
25 Ibid. at para. 108. See also paras. 103 and 106.
do not further the stated goal of greater clarity.26 In sum, the most troubling part of the 
decision is the Court’s reworking of the framework for analyzing a real and substantial 
connection.
5. TAKING AND DECLINING JURISDICTION
In Van Breda the Court reaffirms the important separation between the issue of taking 
jurisdiction and the issue of declining to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of forum  
non conveniens.21 This confirmation is welcome, since from an examination of the 
cases it is apparent that lawyers and judges frequently fail to appreciate the distinction 
between having jurisdiction and the discretion to choose not to exercise jurisdiction by 
staying proceedings.28 However, in stressing this separation the Court may have gone 
too far. In response to concerns raised about Muscutt that the eight-factor framework 
leads to duplication of analysis on each of these two distinct issues, the Court has now 
stated that “the factors listed for consideration at the second, discretionary, forum  non 
conveniens stage, have no bearing on real and substantial connection and, therefore, 
should not be considered at the first stage of jurisdiction sim pliciter analysis.”29
The difficulty here is that the Court seems to have overstated this point. Some 
core factual connections must be considered as part of both issues. This fact should be 
clear from the nature of the analysis itself. The test for jurisdiction attempts to determine 
whether a dispute has sufficient factual connections to the forum. The test for forum  
non conveniens attempts to determine which of the forum and a foreign jurisdiction 
has the better factual connections to the dispute. So the factual connections between 
a dispute and the forum must be part of the analysis for both issues. For example, as 
a factual connection, the place where a tort was committed or where a contract was 
breached must be relevant both to assessing a real and substantial connection and to 
the analysis under forum  non conveniens. To take another example, the fact that a 
defendant resides in Michigan will be relevant both to determining whether there is a 
real and substantial connection to Ontario and to forum  non conveniens.
What needs to be kept separate are the two issues of taking and declining 
jurisdiction. It is not a logical corollary to that separation that certain factual 
connections must only be relevant to one issue or the other. It is entirely possible
26 Ibid. at paras. 98, 103, 106 and 108. In applying the factor concerning fairness to the 
defendant and to the plaintiff (the court having held these should now be treated as a 
single factor rather than as two factors: para. 97) the court’s approach (at para. 121) was 
to “consider the connections between the claim, [the defendant] and Ontario through the 
lens o f fairness to assess their significance and weight in relation to a real and substantial 
connection” [emphasis added]. This is not an easy approach to understand.
27 Ibid. at paras. 81-82.
28 Cheryl Dusten & Stephen G.A. Pitel, “The Right Answers to Ontario’s Jurisdictional 
Questions: Dismiss, Stay or Set Service Aside” (2005) 30 Adv. Q. 297.
29 Van Breda, supra note 4 at para. 82.
to separate the issues while considering various factual connections as relevant to 
both, and examples o f courts doing precisely that abound in the jurisprudence. In Van 
Breda the court appears to be attempting to create a rigid separation of the factors to 
be addressed on each issue. Such a separation is of doubtful utility,30 and in any case 
is, at least as far as core factual connections are concerned, not possible.
6. A FORUM OF NECESSITY
Section 6 of the CJPTA provides for what has been called a forum of necessity. Under 
this provision, a court that lacks jurisdiction over a dispute can nevertheless hear that 
dispute if either there is no court outside the forum where the plaintiff can commence 
proceedings or commencing proceedings in a court outside the forum cannot be 
reasonably required. This provision might, for example, allow a person tortured in a 
foreign country to sue the torturers, despite the lack of connecting factors between the 
place of the torture and the forum. It has been argued that due to extraterritoriality this 
section of the CJPTA is “fragile from a constitutional point of view.”31
While not necessary to decide the issues raised on the appeals, in Van Breda  
the Court, as a matter of common law, adopts the concept of a forum of necessity. It 
states that “the overriding concern for access to justice that motivates the assumption 
of jurisdiction despite inadequate connection with the forum should be accommodated 
by explicit recognition of the forum of necessity.”32 The Court’s analysis of this 
issue is problematic. It is surprisingly brief and makes no mention of the possible 
constitutional deficiencies in this approach. The Court has also left itself open to 
the charge that this development should have been left either to the legislature or 
for another case raising the forum of necessity directly and featuring more detailed 
submissions on the point.
7. CONCLUSION
For many, Van Breda violates the idiom “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” The Muscutt 
framework was well-known and was working effectively.33 It was relatively easy to 
explain and to apply. In time we will know if as much can be said for the use of 
presumptions and the Van Breda framework, but for the moment there are questions 
about how the presumption will operate when challenged by a defendant and about the 
ongoing role of the factors the Court now calls analytic tools.
30 Vaughan Black & Mat Brechtel, “Revisiting Muscutt: The Ontario Court of Appeal Takes 
Another Look” (2009) 36 Adv. Q. 35 at 44-45.
31 Elizabeth Edinger, “New British Columbia Legislation: The Court Jurisdiction and 
Proceedings Transfer Acf, The Enforcement o f Canadian Judgments and Decrees Act" (2006)
39 U.B.C.L. Rev. 407 at 417. For inconclusive judicial discussion see Lailey v. International 
Student Volunteers, Inc., 2008 BCSC 1344 at paras. 41-49.
32 Supra note 4 at para. 100. See also para. 109(10).
33 Black & Brechtel, supra note 30 at 35.
In its reasons, the court was undoubtedly motivated by efficiency concerns. 
The most influential reason behind adopting these presumptions is that this “will 
simplify and reduce the instance and cost of litigation on the issue of jurisdiction.”34 
Similarly, the test for a real and substantial connection is reworked to achieve greater 
“clarity and ease in its application.”35 In straightforward cases, rather than using 
the eight factors from Muscutt, courts will now likely proceed as follows. In some 
cases the issue of jurisdiction will be determined based solely on the presumption, 
unchallenged or not seriously challenged by the defendant, and so no factors will need 
to be considered. In some other cases the court will determine whether there is a real 
and substantial connection with reference only to the two factors Van Breda has called 
the core of the test: the connections between the forum and the plaintiff’s claim and 
the defendant. The demotion of the other six factors to analytical tools means that in 
practice they will have a much reduced role and in some cases will not be mentioned 
at all. This change will certainly streamline the analysis in simple cases, yet it is hard 
to see how in such cases using the Muscutt approach was so burdensome or produced 
incorrect decisions. Moreover, as noted, we now have some unsettled aspects of the 
new approach that could prove difficult in more complicated cases. When familiar 
tests are modified, uncertainty and confusion are likely, if only in the short term.
As a final, broader point, Van Breda is likely to have repercussions beyond 
the context of taking jurisdiction. The real and substantial connection test is used 
in other contexts, most notably as part of the test for whether a court will recognize 
and enforce the judgment of another province or a foreign country.36 In that context, 
courts have used the Muscutt framework to determine whether there was a real and 
substantial connection between the dispute and the forum in which the judgment was 
rendered. It is an open question whether the use of presumptions and the reformulated 
framework in Van Breda are now to replace that approach in that context.
34 Ibid. at para. 77.
35 Ibid. at para. 83.
36 Beals v. Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416.
